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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 4

Adenauer's Victory: An Advance for Democracy?

By Louise W. Holborn

The Federal Republic of Germany occupies a strong position in Europe today, with the most stable currency outside the dollar area and a strategic importance based on its manpower, its economic potential and its geographical situation. This position gives particular significance to the results of the election for its Bundestag (lower house) on September 15, 1957, which brought an overwhelming victory for the federal chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, and his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with its Bavarian affiliate, the Christian Social Union (CSU). In a remarkably high poll in which 88.24 of the eligible voters participated, the CDU/CSU gained just over half the votes, as compared to 45.2 percent in 1953, and elected 270 out of the 497 deputies, in place of 244 in 1953.*

As important as the fact that the CDU/CSU gained the majority of the seats in the Bundestag for the first time since the Federal Republic was founded in 1949 is the disappearance of splinter parties, formerly so common in Germany. Although 13 parties presented

candidates in the election, only 4 are represented in the Bundestag: the CDU/CSU, which forms the government; the chief opposition, the Social Democratic party (SPD), which won 169 seats (compared to 151 in 1953) and increased its percentage of the poll from 28.8 in 1953 to 31.8; the Free Democratic party (FDP), which declined from 48 to 41 seats; and the German party (DP), which elected 17 representatives, as compared to 15 in 1953. Most striking of the changes is that the Refugee party, which had 27 deputies in the last Bundestag, has none in the present House. None of the smaller parties secured either 5 percent of the total votes or the 3 seats by direct votes in local districts which would have provided representation in the Bundestag. Thus Nazis and Communists have also vanished as political forces.

That both the CDU/CSU and the SPD increased their share of the votes and seats brings Germany closer to the two-party system than it has been since 1945. Moreover, the DP placed its representatives in the Bundestag only by winning six seats in local districts, which was a result of its strong support by the CDU. The CDU seems to have gained

*In addition to the above mentioned 497 deputies, 22 nonvoting delegates were chosen by the West Berlin Parliament on September 15 as follows: 12 SPD, 7 CDU, 2 FDP and 1 DP.

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votes from the small parties and the new voters (35 million eligible voters in 1957 as compared to 33 million in 1953). By contrast, the SPD seems to have gained only a small percentage of the new young voters on the rolls and failed to broaden its electoral support among the Catholic workers despite the fact that it campaigned on a liberal rather than a socialist program. The SPD's increase of votes came mainly from the 300,000 who formerly supported Dr. Heine-mann's neutralist party (GVP), which dissolved in June 1957 when its leader joined the SPD, and from the 600,000 Communist voters who were instructed by their leaders to vote for the SPD. In the Bundestag the SPD, for the first time, now holds one-third of the seats, which means that it can block any legislation aimed at revision of the constitution and also that it can have the Bundestag convened at its own initiative.

Why Adenauer Won

What accounts for the decisive renewal of Dr. Adenauer's mandate for a third time despite the widespread and sometimes bitter criticism of the government in the weeks before the election? At that time one heard much about the chancellor's advanced age, his authoritarian handling of his cabinet and party colleagues, his unwillingness to take the opposition into his confidence, fear of Church interference in politics, and hopes for a more constructive approach to the reunification of Germany. Yet in the end more decisive factors influenced the electors.

Foremost among them was the "economic miracle": virtual full employment, record exports nearly a third higher than in 1954, a more or less successful fight with inflation and a stable currency. Meanwhile, the opposition, the SPD, had shelved its traditional demand for nationalization of heavy industry, dropped its social reform program and evolved nothing so attractive as the government's remarkable increase of old-age pensions and promise of tax reductions. Even the trade unions which were not affiliated with particular parties asked their members to vote for the party which had done most for trade union interests.

In foreign affairs the government stood on its record: the winning of independence and subsequently of membership in NATO and the Western European Union. Though Adenauer's policy of strength and alignment with the West has not secured reunification, the Berlin Declaration of July 29, 1957, signed by the United States, Britain, France and Germany, recognizes the right of the German people to reestablish their national unity. In comparison the SPD proposal to ban nuclear weapons in Germany through a provision of the Federal constitution and to create a European security system—including a demilitarized reunited Germany, which would be guaranteed by both the United States and the Soviet Union—appeared too vague and unrealistic to the voters. Moreover, the Soviet Union itself aided Dr. Adenauer's cause through its intransigence over the repatriation of German prisoners, as

well as Khrushchev's violent attack on the chancellor during his visit to East Berlin and his renewed refusal to discuss concretely the problem of reunification.

New Stability

In the three elections since 1949 the German people have more and more voted conservative, but in the sense of conserving their newly built economic system within the framework of the Western community. The time is now at hand to transform what is a well-functioning state apparatus into a working democratic parliamentary system. The operations of the last Bundestag showed an encouraging degree of give-and-take in the legislative process between the government and opposition. The election campaign was quiet and reasonable, with many indications that the electorate prefers to see political issues argued on a higher plane. Perhaps above all, the elimination of the splinter and extremist parties, which have been the bane of German political life in the past, shows a substantial degree of maturity and political judgment on the part of the electorate. If the CDU uses its electoral victory to develop truly national policies in which all parties can feel they have a share, the 1957 election may mark a decisive step toward a genuine German democratic nationhood.

Miss Louise W. Holborn, professor of government at Connecticut College, recently returned from Germany, where she spent the summer as a Fulbright guest-professor at the American Institute of the University of Cologne and also lectured in Berlin and throughout West Germany under the program of the USIS.

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Our Changing Foreign Policy

Something is happening to American foreign policy—something significant, possibly decisive. You don't notice it day by day—but month by month this something becomes identifiable. It can be defined in various ways. United States foreign policy is becoming less rigid. It is exhibiting more flexibility, a certain resilience and some major modifications. It is, in short, adapting itself to a changing world. Mr. Dulles' four-hour conference of October 5 with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and our reaction to Moscow's launching of the earth satellite reflect the change in atmosphere.

And if this is happening to United States foreign policy, it is, of course, happening to the Secretary of State. For Mr. Dulles epitomizes American foreign policy perhaps more than any Secretary of State in this generation.

The New Trends

It is true that a certain adjustment to world events goes on regularly in the foreign policy of any country, regardless of the individual who makes it. But the principal characteristic of United States foreign policy since 1953 has been its constancy. You knew that "massive retaliation" was still our military policy, that Red China was still diplomatically and socially untouchable, that Washington was as determined as ever to keep the U.S.S.R. out of the Middle East—by any means including arms. These were major landmarks on which one could count among the shifting tides of events.

But that seems to be changing. No longer is massive retaliation the principal if not the only answer the United States has to Communist aggres-

sions. Now it is a matter of developing smaller and still smaller, cleaner and still cleaner, nuclear weapons to make massive retaliation only a last resort. No longer is Peiping completely outside the pale of Western contacts. Now there is talk of lowering the barricades around Peiping. No longer is it a question of keeping the U.S.S.R. out of the Middle East. Rather it is a matter of confining and restricting the activities of the Russians and their influence in that area. Washington correspondents see a "new" Mr. Dulles, just as the policies being pursued are "new."

Perhaps the most significant change in United States policy has been in the field of military strategy. It was Mr. Dulles who announced the massive-retaliation doctrine with considerable publicity on January 12, 1954. The conclusion then was that henceforth all our future wars would necessarily be big ones. Now Mr. Dulles, as a result, among other things, of advances in weaponizing, has come out in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs* for localized wars, for small wars, for containing whatever fighting breaks out. This gives the United States a choice of reactions to Communist aggression. War, now, will not have to mean either a global holocaust or abject surrender. This puts wars back into the category in which they were before the atomic age.

Change on China

Our policy toward Red China is also changing—although Mr. Dulles is not yet ready to admit it. The United States has had to approve of more and more trading by its allies with Peiping. It has backtracked on

its refusal to let American newsmen into Communist China. It is permitting Chinese Communist athletes to come here for the Olympic winter games. It has done away with fingerprinting for bona fide tourists, even Chinese Communists. Red China is a long way from being accepted by Washington as a national state, but it is no longer as untouchable as it was.

Russia and Middle East

Or take events in the Middle East. For months after the Russians had entered the Middle East through diplomacy, economic assistance and arms aid, the United States pointed to the Eisenhower Doctrine as proof the Kremlin was blocked in that area. Yet events in Syria and the situation in Egypt are evidence that Moscow is in the Middle East, if not by outright aggression, at least by subversion, cooperation and propaganda. The once hard United States line that Moscow was not to be tolerated has now been changed to the question of how to confine its influence and activities, how to live with this problem, how to get the Arabs to clean house themselves rather than make the West do it.

What is clear is that Mr. Dulles is showing a new mellowness, a resilience, a human warmth of which Washington had not been aware before. In his *Foreign Affairs* article the Secretary stated again and again and again that this country's policies had necessarily to be modified with changing world-conditions, that change is actually beneficent and that change is the law of life—international life included.

NEAL STANFORD



Kashmir: A Tangled Skein

NEW DELHI—There are some territories on the face of the globe which, because of their desirability—strategic or economic or both—seem destined to be bones of contention between neighboring nations. The list of these territories is long and repeatedly marked by bloodshed: Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar, Trieste, Danzig, the Polish Corridor, Korea and—since the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent—Kashmir.

Both of the nations that emerged from partition, India and Pakistan, claim that beautiful area, with its jewel-like lakes set among Himalayan peaks and its sturdy population, which in its history has known the passage of many conquerors. Neither has shown signs of yielding its claim in the past decade, which is strewn with abortive bilateral negotiations and the failures of successive efforts at United Nations mediation.

Here is the Indian point of view on Kashmir. The Pakistani point of view will be discussed in a subsequent article.

As India Sees It

As India sees it, Kashmir, one of the 562 princely states of undivided India, which were advised by Britain to choose between India and Pakistan, opted for India through the decision of its Hindu maharajah, Sir Hari Singh, supported by his Muslim prime minister, Sheik Abdullah, a member of the Indian National Congress and a close friend of India's prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. He did this, India contends, after Pakistan had committed aggression by furnishing arms and military direction to "tribesmen" who invaded the western portion of the state, coming within five miles of its summer

capital, Srinagar. India, therefore, say its spokesmen, had no choice but to send armed forces to Kashmir, at its ruler's request, to protect a state which had signified its desire to become part of the Indian Union.

True, at that time Mr. Nehru, at the suggestion of India's last viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, agreed that the people of Kashmir should have an opportunity to express their views about the accession, but only after the Pakistanis had withdrawn from the territory they had occupied—a condition Pakistan has so far not fulfilled. Lord Mountbatten's proposal was due to two factors: Kashmir's contiguity to both India and Pakistan, and the presence of a Muslim majority in the Vale. Mr. Nehru's agreement to a plebiscite is regarded by many, not only in India but also outside, as a political mistake. For no arrangements were made about plebiscites in any of the other 561 states.

Mr. Nehru now takes the view that ten years later, when conditions in the subcontinent and in the world have changed, a plebiscite in Kashmir, if it favored Pakistan, would lead to renewed turmoil and bloodshed among Muslims and Hindus in both Pakistan and India and could jeopardize India's very existence. This, however, is disputed by some leading Hindus, who say the assumption they would maltreat Muslims because of Kashmir is a libel on Hinduism.

Many Indians feel puzzled and aggrieved that the Western powers, quick to denounce aggressors elsewhere, have refused to recognize Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir. Others urge the government to give up the Vale for the sake of improving relations with Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the Indian government in 1953 summarily deposed and jailed Sheik Abdullah, once its trusted friend, on the ground that he favored an independent Kashmir, which, New Delhi feared, might have gone over to Pakistan. And Kashmir's Constituent Assembly, under the leadership of the Muslim prime minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, voted in 1956 to make Kashmir a state of the Indian Union, thereby confirming the *status quo*. This vote is regarded by many Indians as a consultation of the will of the people.

Pakistan, as India knows well, disagrees with these arguments. It takes the view that the predominantly Muslim population of Kashmir was not consulted about its wishes; that India highhandedly took over Kashmir; that it added insult to injury by disregarding the United Nations Security Council; that it rules the Muslims by force; and that it is obligated to hold the plebiscite, which, Karachi contends, would result in an overwhelming vote for accession to Pakistan.

The Jarring Report

Impartial observers believe that of Kashmir's component parts Jammu—with its predominantly Hindu population—Buddhist Ladakh, and Gilgit would go to India and that the crucial decision would have to be made only in the Vale of Kashmir. But the Vale, often called India's Switzerland, with its scenic beauties and its attraction for tourists, is an important prize for both countries, quite aside from religious and political considerations.

Gunnar Jarring, Sweden's permanent delegate to the United Nations

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New Trends in Ceylon

by Arthur C. Turner

Dr. Turner, chairman of the Division of Social Sciences on the Riverside campus of the University of California since 1953, has also taught at Berkeley and at the University of Toronto. Among his publications are a study of NATO, *Bulwark of the West* (Toronto, Ryerson, 1953), and chapters on India, Pakistan and Ceylon in the cooperative work *Control of Foreign Relations* (New York, Norton, 1957).

SINCE the spring of 1956 the beautiful island of Ceylon has been the scene of a number of political changes which are likely to have considerable effect on its internal development. These changes will also make the role Ceylon plays in international affairs both more significant and more difficult to predict.

Before 1956 the tranquillity of the island had made it exceptional among almost all the countries of Asia or Africa. Independent since 1948, Ceylon was governed under a stable parliamentary system. The ruling United National party (UNP), although it insisted on maintaining mutually advantageous trade with Communist China, was in general friendly to the West. The prime minister, Sir John Kotelawala, made world headlines at the Bandung conference in April 1956 by his forthright reminder that condemnation of colonialism logically implied condemnation of Communist expansion as well.

Bandaranaike's Coalition

It would be an exaggeration to suggest that there has been a complete turnabout in government policy, or a grave decline in civil order or political harmony in the island. Far-reaching changes, however, have come about as a result of the shattering defeat in the April 1956 general election of Sir John Kotelawala's United National party. The victors, led by Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who became prime minister, constituted the coalition known as MEP (*Mahajana Eksath Peramuna*, People's United Front party). This was a somewhat loose alliance of parties sharing in

varying degrees a leftward inclination, but united by little more than a common desire to oust from office the long-ruling United National party.

The chief element in the MEP coalition is Mr. Bandaranaike's own SLFP (*Sri Lanka—Ceylon—Freedom party*). The MEP also includes one of Ceylon's two Trotskyite parties, the VLSSP (*Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaja party*), the BP (*Bhasa Peramuna*, Language party) and smaller groups. Of the 95 elective seats in the House of Representatives, the MEP at the 1956 election obtained 51; the NLSSP (*Nava Lanka Sama Samaja*, the other Trotskyite party) was second with 14 and the Tamil Federal party gained 10. The Communist party, as in the previous Parliament, held three seats.

By contrast the United National party, which had had 54 seats, won only 8. This figure, however, far from accurately represented the UNP's voting strength in the country, for in the election it had polled almost three-quarters of a million votes, as against just over a million for the victorious MEP combination. This disproportion of figures was in large measure due to a "no contest" agreement among the MEP parties, as well as the NLSSP and the Communists, in which they all agreed not to put up candidates against each other in any constituency so as to avoid splitting the anti-UNP vote.

There are various reasons for the electoral reverse the UNP encountered eight years after independence. One was the simple fact that it had held a monopoly of political power in

the island for too long and, confirmed in office by an overwhelming victory in the general election of 1952, had in some measure succumbed to the temptations of complacency, jobbery and "the insolence of office." Sir John Kotelawala, who succeeded the younger D. S. Senanayake as prime minister in 1953, was invariably honest and frequently blunt in expressing his opinions. He made few attempts to conciliate those who disagreed with him.

Revival of Nationalism

There are deeper currents, however, in Ceylon than mere irritation at the complacency of a party too long in power. In the first place, the last year or two have seen a strong upsurge of Sinhalese nationalism, which has inevitably found expression in some degree of hostility both to European influences and to the Indian Tamil-speaking minority. The members of the new government—to cite a rather conspicuous example—have set a fashion by abandoning European coats and trousers on public occasions and reverting to traditional native dress. At the state opening of parliament the beating of traditional ceremonial drums has replaced fanfares of trumpets.

The revival of Sinhalese nationalism has been accompanied by a revival of the Buddhist religion and a conspicuous increase in the political role played by the yellow-robed *bhikkhus*, the Buddhist clergy. Active canvassing up and down the villages of the island by the *bhikkhus* did much to influence voting in favor of the MEP.

Associated with the Sinhalese and Buddhist resurgence has been a marked drift to the Left in public opinion on the island. The UNP had come to be represented as too friendly to the British owners of the great tea plantations, too much the organ of the wealthy English-speaking land-owners and businessmen of Ceylon. These accusations proved effective politically.

Sinhalese and Tamils

The Buddhist-Sinhalese revival has, by its very nature, tended to exacerbate communal divisions within the island. The population of Ceylon is strongly diversified, although the various groups have so far lived together with an admirable degree of harmony. About 70 percent, or 5.8 million, are Sinhalese, who are generally Buddhists. Distinct from them and numerically second in importance are the Tamils, immigrants from India, totaling about 2 million. These live mostly in the northern and eastern provinces and are Hindu by religion. They are divided about equally into "Ceylon Tamils," immigrants of many centuries ago, and "Indian Tamils," more recent immigrants. There are also more than half a million "Moors," followers of Islam who are descended from Arab traders of medieval times.

One of the chief planks in the MEP platform in the 1956 election was a promise to make Sinhalese the national language—a promise which had been previously made by the UNP. The Sinhalese Only Act, providing that Sinhalese was to become the sole official language of the country, was passed by the MEP government in 1956. It created great bitterness on the part of the Tamils, who observed February 4, the anniversary of independence, as a day of mourning. Riots occurred on several occasions. The Tamil-organized Federal party pressed for a federal system

that would give the Tamil provinces control of their own affairs. There was even talk of partitioning the island.

The situation reached a climax and, at any rate for the moment, a peaceful resolution in August 1957. The Federal party had scheduled a civil disobedience campaign to begin on August 20. To counteract this the government organized a plan for 100,000 youth volunteers. Civil order in the Tamil provinces seemed on the verge of dissolution. At the end of July, however, after a meeting between the prime minister and the leaders of the Federal party, a compromise was announced. The demonstrations and countermeasures were called off. Sinhalese remains the only official language of the island, but Tamil is recognized as "the language of a national minority" and is to be used in the administration of the Tamil provinces. There will be no federal constitution, but regional councils will be established to give the Tamils a degree of local autonomy. This, as Mr. Bandaranaike has said, is "a victory for sanity and good sense."

During the election the MEP program also featured an attack on private ownership of industry. So far the only industry that has been nationalized is the bus system. Bus lines will pass into the hands of the state on January 1, 1958. The already emerging problems of that change-over are enough to justify the government's caution in regard to the project of nationalizing the great tea estates (three-quarters British-owned), the rubber plantations (one-third British-owned) or the coconut estates (mostly owned by Ceylonese). The whole life of Ceylon depends on the successful maintenance of production of these three great cash crops and the sale of the produce abroad. Most of Ceylon's food has to be imported and paid for by exports.

Tea accounts for two-thirds of the value of Ceylon's exports; rubber, 16 percent; coconut, 13 percent.

Neutrality in World Affairs

The feature of the new Ceylon government's policy which is of most direct interest to Western statesmanship is, of course, that of external relations. The MEP election program proclaimed the intention to adopt an attitude of neutrality in the struggle between the West and communism; to end Britain's use of bases on the island; and to eliminate the British Crown from the constitution of Ceylon.

These objectives have been largely carried out. On questions of foreign policy the government of Ceylon is now following a neutralist line very closely akin to that of Prime Minister Nehru in India. Any prospect there might have been of Ceylon joining the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has now disappeared. Symbols of these changes have been the visits to Ceylon of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in February 1957 and of Mr. Nehru in May on the occasion of the celebrations of the 2500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha, which opportunely for the new government came this year. During the Nehru visit a joint communique was issued by the two prime ministers urging an end to nuclear bomb tests and stating their concern over the Middle East.

At the same time, Mr. Bandaranaike has been anxious to make clear that he is not an extremist and that he has not drifted into the Communist orbit. He visited the United States informally in November 1956. In a speech on April 3, 1957 he denied that Ceylon was leaning toward communism. On May 25 he declared that he will seek technical assistance from the United States, Britain, the U.S.S.R. and India.

Even after Ceylon became inde-

pendent, the Royal Navy, on the basis of the defense agreement of November 1947, continued to have the use of the magnificent harbor of Trincomalee, and the Royal Air Force of the base at Katunayake. When the MEP came into power it served notice that it wanted to end these arrangements—a position accepted by Britain in principle in July 1956. In Colombo on June 7, 1957 it was announced that “The Royal Naval base at Trincomalee and the Royal Air Force station at Katunayake will be formally transferred to the Ceylon government on October 15 and November 1 respectively. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom establishments will be in the main completed within a period of three years, though some facilities will remain for up to five years.” It was also agreed that the Ceylon government would pay about \$5 million in compensation for Britain’s fixed assets. The good manners displayed on both sides, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the loss of these bases is a considerable blow to the security system of the free world.

Ceylon’s intention to become a republic was announced by Mr. Bandaranaike at the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference in July 1956. When this step is taken the change will be purely nominal. For the governor-general, the Queen’s representative in Ceylon, has been a Ceylonese since 1954, when Sir Oliver Goonetilleke was appointed to this post.

Ceylon and Hungary

Ceylon has been a member of the United Nations only since December 1955. Previously Russia had repeatedly vetoed its application. As a consequence, Ceylon then had no diplomatic relations with either Russia or Communist China. Since 1955 it has established relations with both. Although a newcomer to the world or-

ganization, Ceylon has played a significant part in UN discussions on Hungary, serving as a member (along with Australia, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay) of the Special Committee on Hungary set up in January 1957. The committee’s report, made public in June, declared that the Hungarian uprising was spontaneous and that the U.S.S.R. had forcibly overthrown the legitimate government of Mr. Imre Nagy.

The very able Mr. R. S. S. Gunewardene, who is both Ceylonese ambassador to the United States and its representative in the UN, had to face strong criticism in Ceylon for his signature to this report. At a meeting of the MEP party in Colombo on July 2 a resolution of no confidence in the ambassador was moved, but was later withdrawn at the prime minister’s request. Defending himself in a speech given at a reception in his honor at Colombo on July 7, Mr. Gunewardene said that he had done his level best to be impartial during the committee’s work and that “no sane man could have come to any other conclusion.”

The future policy of the Bandaranaike government of Ceylon is difficult to assess. In local government elections it has already lost heavily to the UNP. Yet to hold the coalition together, the government may have to go further to the Left. Much will depend on the personality of the prime minister, and that is somewhat enigmatic. Mr. Bandaranaike was himself a member of the UNP, and a cabinet minister, until he resigned in 1952 to lead the Opposition. He was educated at Oxford and is a barrister of the Inner Temple. Like Nehru he disapproved of Britain’s Suez adventure in November 1956, but like Nehru he refused to use it as an excuse to leave the Commonwealth.

In his handling of the language question, Mr. Bandaranaike has dis-

played an ability to avoid extremism and to achieve workable compromises. Thus there is some reason to hope that the issues confronting Ceylon will be handled with the moderation which is in accordance with the best traditions of the island.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Gordon Gaskill, “Ceylon: Isle of Delight,” *The Reader’s Digest*, July 1957; Sir John Kotelawala, *An Asian Prime Minister’s Story* (London, Harrap, 1956); C. L. Sulzberger, three articles on Ceylon, *The New York Times*, March 20, 23 and 25, 1957; “The Unorthodox Left and the Ceylon Elections,” *The World Today*, Vol. 12, No. 5, May 1956; “A ‘People’s Government’: Social and Political Trends in Ceylon,” *The World Today*, Vol. 12, No. 7, July 1956.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 28)

and former president of the Security Council, in his report of April 30, 1957 on the Kashmir question, expressed his awareness of “the grave problems that might arise in connection with and as a result of a plebiscite.” He called to the Council’s attention that “the implementation of international agreements of an *ad hoc* character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change.” He added, “I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia.”

This statement has been interpreted in New Delhi as suggesting that given the state of the world in general and the unabated tensions between India and Pakistan in particular, the best that can be done is to maintain the *status quo*. Although these tensions emerged in the course of the partition of the subcontinent, in which the United States was not involved, they have been seriously ag-

gravated by American military aid to Pakistan since 1950.

U.S. Aid to Pakistan

From Washington's point of view this aid is part of our over-all program of assisting weak peoples around the periphery of Russia and China to defend themselves in case of Communist aggression. From the point of view of even the most moderate Indians, however, this aid could be used by the Pakistanis against India. Although Indian leaders are willing to believe that Washington will not permit the use of its arms for this purpose, they ask, "How will you stop such use once it starts? Have you succeeded in preventing the use of your arms by France in Algeria, by Britain and France at Suez?" What is even more alarming is the rising demand in India for larger expenditures on armaments to offset American arms for Pakistan at the very time when every rupee is needed for the second Five-Year Plan. The result is that many Indians tend to identify the United States with Pakistan and wonder why Washington supports Pakistan on Kashmir in the United Nations.

But even if it were possible, and advisable, to maintain the *status quo* internationally, will it be possible to do it within Kashmir itself? So far as can be ascertained, the Kashmiris are uneasy about their present situation. Recurring attempts to review

the case in the UN and threats broadcast by the Pakistani radio create a sense of insecurity, which has an unfavorable effect on business and particularly on its most important component—tourism. People in Kashmir say, "Let's get this settled once and for all."

What Kashmiris Think

Sheik Abdullah, in spite of (or perhaps because of) his four-year imprisonment, remains a highly popular leader. If and when he is released, he might rally around him those Kashmiris who are discontented with India—even though they welcome its economic aid. The future is further clouded by the struggle for power which developed last summer between Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, prime minister and president of the National Conference (Kashmir's counterpart of India's Congress party) and G. M. Sadiq, believed by his critics to be a fellow traveler, if not a Communist, who after an open break on August 9 left the conference and formed a party of his own. New Delhi is backing Bakshi, but Sadiq also has some support in India—although he has been weakened by the outright stand of the Indian Communist party in his favor.

Whose side would the Sheik join? And would he still urge independence for Kashmir? Those who oppose that alternative among them, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, a force-

ful personality—say that Kashmir could not long survive independence. It is economically weak, they argue, and depends on India for both economic and military aid. If it gained independence it would promptly become a pawn in the cold war. And India continues to fear that independence would ultimately mean going over to Pakistan.

In India itself there is a feeling of guilt about Abdullah. It was expressed most clearly by the Socialist leader, Jaya Prakash Narayan, on August 27, when he said that "the policy followed with regard to Kashmir had led to the deterioration of relations with Pakistan." He favors the release of Sheik Abdullah, who then, he thinks, would be able to persuade the Kashmiris to accept an independent and sovereign Kashmir, which could be guaranteed by both India and Pakistan.

No solution so far proposed for Kashmir is ideal from the point of view of either of the two nations that emerged from the travail of partition. But responsible people on both sides, as well as in the UN, believe it is essential to find as soon as possible a basis for restoring good relations, which are crucial for the peaceful development of both.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The last of three articles on current developments in India.)

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